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ARE CONTRADICTIONS OF IDEAS AND BELIEFS LIKELY TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT GROUP- MAKING RÔLE IN THE FUTURE?

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The question which I am expected to attempt in this paper to answer was suggested to me by the Programme Committee. I have adopted the committee's phrasing of it, and I shall endeavor to keep as closely as possible to what I suppose to have been meant by the term "contradictions of ideas and beliefs," and the term "group-making rôle."

It is assumed, I suppose, that contradictions among ideas and beliefs are of various degrees and of various modes besides that specific one which we call logical incompatibility. A perception, for example, may be pictorially inconsistent or tonically discordant with another perception; a mere faith unsupported by objective evidence may be emotionally antagonistic to another mere faith, as truly as a judgment may be logically irreconcilable with another judgment. And this wide possibility of contradiction is particularly to be recognized when the differing ideas or beliefs have arisen not within the same individual mind, but in different minds, and are therefore colored by personal or partisan interest, and warped by idiosyncrasy of mental constitution. The contradictions of, or rather *among*, ideas and beliefs with which we are now concerned, are more extensive and more varied than mere logical duels; they are also less definite, less precise. In reality they are culture conflicts, in which the opposing forces, so far from being specific ideas only, or pristine beliefs only, are in fact more or less bewildering complexes of ideas, beliefs, prejudices, sympathies, antipathies, and personal interests.

It is assumed also, I suppose, that any idea or group of ideas, any belief or group of beliefs, may happen to be, or may become,

a common interest, shared by a small or a large number of individuals. It may draw and hold them together in bonds of acquaintance, of association, even of co-operation. It thus may play a group-making rôle. Contradictory ideas or beliefs, therefore, may play a group-making rôle in a double sense. Each draws into association the individual minds that entertain it or find it attractive. Each also repels those minds to whom it is repugnant, and drives them toward the group which is being formed about the contradictory idea or belief. Contradictions among ideas and beliefs, then, it may be assumed, tend on the whole to sharpen the lines of demarkation between group and group.

These assumptions are, I suppose, so fully justified by the everyday observation of mankind, and so confirmed by history, that it is unnecessary now to discuss them, or in any way to dwell upon them. The question before us therefore becomes specific: "Are contradictions among ideas and beliefs likely to play an *important* group-making rôle in the future?" I shall interpret the word *important* as connoting quality as well as quantity. I shall, in fact, attempt to answer the question set for me by translating it into this inquiry, namely: What kind or type of groups are the inevitable contradictions among ideas and beliefs most likely to create and to maintain within the progressive populations of the world, from this time forth?

Somewhat more than three hundred years ago, Protestantism and geographical discovery had combined to create conditions extraordinarily favorable to the formation of groups or associations about various conflicting ideas and beliefs functioning as nuclei; and for nearly three hundred years the world has been observing a remarkable multiplication of culture groups of two fundamentally different types. One type is a sect, or denomination, having no restricted local habitation, but winning adherents here and there in various communes, provinces, or nations, and having, therefore, a membership either locally concentrated or more or less widely dispersed; either regularly or most irregularly distributed. The culture group of the other type, or kind, is a self-sufficing community. It may be a village, a colony, a state,

or a nation. Its membership is concentrated, its habitat is defined.

To a very great extent, as everybody knows, American colonization proceeded through the formation of religious communities. Such were the Pilgrim and the Puritan commonwealths. Such were the Quaker groups of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Such were the localized societies of the Dunkards, the Moravians, and the Mennonites.

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, the American people witnessed the birth and growth of one of the most remarkable religious communities known in history. The Mormon community of Utah, which, originating in 1830 as a band of relatives and acquaintances, clustered by an idea that quickly became a dogma, had become in fifty years a commonwealth *de facto*, defying the authority *de jure* of the United States.

We are not likely, however, again to witness a phenomenon of this kind in the civilized world. Recently we have seen the rise and the astonishingly rapid spread of another American religion, namely, the Christian Science faith. But it has created no community group. It has created only a dispersed sect. It is obvious to any intelligent observer, however untrained in sociological discrimination he may be, that the forces of Protestantism, still dividing and differentiating as they are, no longer to any great extent create new self-sufficing communities. They create only associations of irregular geographical dispersion, of more or less unstable or shifting membership. In a word, the conflicting-idea forces, which in our colonial days tended to create community groups as well as sects, tend now to create sectarian bodies only—mere denominational or partisan associations.

A similar contrast between an earlier and a later stage of culture group-making may be observed if we go back to centuries long before the Protestant Reformation, there to survey a wider field and a longer series of historical periods.

It is a commonplace of historical knowledge that in all of the earliest civilizations there was an approximate identification of religion with ethnic consciousness and of political consciousness with both religious and race feeling. Each people had its own

tribal or national gods, who were inventoried as national assets, at valuations quite as high as those attached to tribal or national territory.

When, however, Roman imperial rule had been extended over the civilized world, the culture conflicts that then arose expended their group-creating force in simply bringing together like believers in sectarian association. Christianity, appealing to all bloods, in some measure to all economic classes, and spreading into all sections of the eastern Mediterranean region, did not to any great extent create communities. And what was true of Christianity was in like manner true of the Mithras cult, widely diffused in the second Christian century. Even Mohammedanism, a faith seemingly well calculated to create autonomous states, in contact with a world prepared by Roman organization could not completely identify itself with definite political boundaries.

The proximate causes of these contrasts are not obscure. We must suppose that a self-sufficing community might at one time as well as at another be drawn together by formative beliefs. But that it may take root somewhere and, by protecting itself against destructive external influences, succeed for a relatively long time in maintaining its integrity and its solidarity, it must enjoy a relative isolation. In a literal sense it must be beyond easy reach of those antagonistic forces which constitute for it the outer world of unbelief and darkness.

Such isolation is easily and often possible, however, only in the early stages of political integration. It is always difficult and unusual in those advanced stages wherein nations are combined in world-empires. It is becoming well-nigh impossible, now that all the continents have been brought under the sovereignty of the so-called civilized peoples, while these peoples themselves, freely communicating and intermingling, maintain with one another that good understanding which constitutes them, in a certain broad sense of the term, a world-society.

The proximate effects also of the contrast that has been sketched are generally recognized.

So long as blood sympathy, religious faith, and political consciousness are approximately coterminous, the groups that they

form, whether local communities or nations, must necessarily be rather sharply delimited. They must be characterized also by internal solidarity. Their membership is stable, because, to break the bond of blood is not only to make oneself an outcast, but is also to be unfaithful to the ancestral gods; to change one's religion is not only to be impious, but is also to commit treason; to expatriate oneself is not only to commit treason, but is also to blaspheme against high heaven.

But when associations of believers, or of persons holding in common any philosophy or doctrine whatsoever, are no longer self-sufficing communities, and when nations, composite in blood, have become compound in structure, all social groups, clusters, or organizations, not only the cultural ones drawn together by formative ideas, but also the economic and the political ones, become in some degree plastic. Their membership then becomes to some extent shifting and renewable. Under these circumstances any given association of men, let it be a village, a religious group, a trade-union, a corporation, or a political party, not only takes into itself new members from time to time; it also permits old members to depart. Men come and men go, yet the association or the group itself persists. As group, or as organization, it remains unimpaired.

The economic advantage secured by this plasticity and renewableness is beyond calculation enormous. It permits and facilitates the drafting of men at any moment from points where they are least needed, for concentration upon points where they are needed most. The spiritual or idealistic advantage is not less great. The concentration of attention and of enthusiasm upon strategic points gives ever-increasing impetus to progressive movements.

Let us turn now from these merely proximate causes and effects of group formation, to take note of certain developmental processes which lie farther back in the evolutionary sequence, and which also have significance for our inquiry, since, when we understand them, they may aid us in our attempt to answer the question, What kind of group-making is likely to be accomplished by cultural conflicts from this time forth?

The most readily perceived, because the most pictorial, of the conflicts arising between one belief and another are those that are waged between beliefs that have been localized and then, through geographical expansion, have come into competition throughout wide frontier areas. Of all such conflicts, that upon which the world has now fully entered between occidental and oriental ideas is not merely the most extensive; it is also by far the most interesting and picturesque.

Less picturesque, but often more dramatic, are the conflicts that arise within each geographical region, within each nation, between old beliefs and new—the conflicts of sequent, in distinction from coexistent ideas; the conflicts in time, in distinction from the conflicts in space. A new knowledge is attained, which compels us to question old dogmas. A new faith arises, which would displace the ancient traditions. As the new waxes strong in some region favorable to it, it begins there, within local limits, to supersede the old. Only then, when the conflict between the old as old, and the new as new, is practically over, does the triumphant new begin to go forth spatially as a conquering influence from the home of its youth into regions outlying and remote.

Whatever the form, however, that the culture conflict assumes, whether serial and dramatic, or geographical and picturesque, its antecedent psychological conditions are in certain great essentials the same. Men array themselves in hostile camps on questions of theory and belief, not merely because they are variously and conflictingly informed, but far more because they are mentally unlike, their minds having been prepared by structural differentiation to seize upon different views and to cherish opposing convictions. That is to say, some minds have become rational, critical, plastic, open, outlooking, above all, intuitive of objective facts and relations. Others, in their fundamental constitution have remained dogmatic, intuitive only of personal attitudes or of subjective moods, temperamentally conservative and instinctive. Minds of the one kind welcome the new and wider knowledge; they go forth to embrace it. Minds of the other kind resist it.

In the segregation thus arising, there is usually discoverable a certain tendency toward grouping by sex.

Whether the mental and moral traits of women are inherent and therefore permanent, or whether they are but passing effects of circumscribed experience, and therefore possibly destined to be modified, is immaterial for my present purpose. It is not certain that either the biologist or the psychologist is prepared to answer the question. It is certain that the sociologist is not. It is enough for the analysis that I am making now if we can say that, as a merely descriptive fact, women thus far in the history of the race have generally been more instinctive, more intuitive of subjective states, more emotional, more conservative than men; and that men, more generally than women, have been intuitive of objective relations, inclined therefore to break with instinct and to rely on the later-developed reasoning processes of the brain, and willing, consequently, to take chances, to experiment, and to innovate.

If so much be granted, we may perhaps say that it is because of these mental differences that in conflicts between new and old ideas, between new knowledge and old traditions, it usually happens that a large majority of all women are found in the camp of the old, and that the camp of the new is composed mainly of men.

In the camp of the new, however, are always to be found women of alert intelligence, who happen also to be temperamentally radical; women in whom the reasoning habit has asserted sway over instinct, and in whom intuition has become the true scientific power to discern objective relations. And in the camp of the old, together with a majority of all women, are to be found most of the men of conservative instinct, and most of those also whose intuitive and reasoning powers are unequal to the effort of thinking about the world or anything in it in terms of impersonal causation. Associated with all of these elements, both male and female, may usually be discovered, finally, a contingent of priestly personalities; not necessarily religious priests, but men who love to assert spiritual dominion, to wield authority,

to be revered and obeyed, and who naturally look for a following among the non-skeptical and easily impressed.

Such, very broadly and rudely sketched, is the psychological background of culture conflict. It is, however, a background only, a certain persistent grouping of forces and conditions; it is not the cause from which culture conflicts proceed.

Always one and the same throughout the ages, although in the course of human history it has assumed endlessly varied outward shapes, the cause of all conflict, cultural, economic, juristic, political, has slowly fashioned also their psychological factors. From the dawn of life until now the alternative has ever and again confronted living things, to change their habits or die. By far the greater part of them have prematurely died because they could not change. Of the survivors, the greater part have lived on because they have changed unconsciously. To a very few, of the human kind, it has been given to know before the event that change must come. They have perceived in time the shifting of external relations, and this perception has been the fearsome New Idea that has set man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother, that has brought not peace on earth, but the sword.

And from the beginning it has literally been true that a man's foes have been they of his own household. Sheltered in some degree in the struggle for existence, women have rarely felt, as men have felt, the first staggering shock of new conditions. They have rarely been compelled to change their outlook and their way of life as unexpectedly and decisively as men have had to change. They have been able therefore to cling longer to the established order, and to cherish for it a lingering sentiment, a deep affection even, that vigorous men have not been able fully to share.

From the beginning, therefore, whenever the necessity for a new adjustment of life to its conditions has arisen, a conflict between old and new habits, between old and new convictions, between old and new sentiments, has been precipitated, and it has arrayed the rationalistic or katabolic minds, chiefly men, against the instinctive or anabolic minds, chiefly women.

Yet from the beginning another tendency also has been mani-

fest. The approximate identification of static interest with woman and of innovating interest with man, never absolute, has become more and more imperfect.

In the dim past of the primitive age, when each sex had its own traditions and its own ritual, each was taboo to the other, except as the taboo could be broken by ceremonial magic.

Yet that primitive cult of the feminine, it is necessary to remember, always included men as well as women. Boys who could not endure the formidable initiation ceremonies that would admit them to the cult of the men, were consigned to the camp of the women, perhaps for life; were often compelled to don female costume and to remain with the women while their more stalwart brothers went forth to the chase or to war. As time went on, around this nucleus of women and effeminate men gathered an ever-enlarging accretion of men somewhat less feminine in mental constitution, although, on the whole, timid and conservative, and therefore antagonistic to a broadly masculine view of life. At length men of strong personality, dogmatic and authoritative, including old and clever men no longer fit for war, seeing their opportunity to establish dominion, threw in their fortunes also with the backward-looking multitude. In the camp thus constituted, there developed one general attitude toward life and conduct, one general scheme of piety and morals. In the boldly masculine camp there developed another. There, superlatively virile minds stood ready to dare new risks. Crudely and awkwardly but fearlessly experimenting, they perfected new adjustments and took the first infinitely difficult steps of human progress.

So, while priests and women created backward-looking religion and a punctilious morality of personal behavior, men of the daring mood—prophet and discoverer, warrior and reformer—created a forward-looking faith and fashioned the plastic secular structure of economic, juristic, and political relations.

From the moment that these differentiations are established, one new adjustment of human life to its changing conditions follows swift upon another. Culture succeeds culture. That which in its day and generation is practical and profane is trans-

muted into the sacred and ceremonial. That which today is faith, front-facing and alive, tomorrow will have become reminiscent religion, the sentimental worship of dead ideas, a thing of gentle memories and regrets.

For long ages, each new faith as it arises, each new economic and juristic order, is locally circumscribed. It cannot pass beyond the bounds of a rigid political organization, and these are identified with the blood of tribe or nation.

But, little by little, political integration is achieved, and as age after age goes by, each new culture finds a wider area open to it for possible extension. At the same time each is more and more restricted as a community-forming activity, because political integration makes isolation difficult. Thenceforward, each culture beats upon every other, each mingles with every other, until at length each blends with all.

The significance of this evolutionary process for our immediate question I conceive to be somewhat as follows:

We are practically at the end of the community-forming stage in culture conflict. Every vigorous group of ideas or beliefs in the world will henceforth have unhindered way to propagate itself geographically, to form vast associations of adherents.

The groups so formed will be somewhat indefinite. In the main they will be plastic. In the main their membership will be mobile and shifting.

That mobility is on all accounts to be desired. But while its gradual increase is on the whole inevitable, it will, nevertheless, in some measure be restricted, and certain tendencies will be manifest toward the formation of relatively definite groups of relatively stable membership. The cause of these tendencies will be the effort which each of these contending forces will make to control and to use the police power of the state.

The police power has always a strictly regional or territorial application. A municipal ordinance is valid for that local area the population of which is incorporated as borough or city. The statute of the commonwealth applies throughout the territory of that state, but not elsewhere. The laws and administrative orders

of a national government have force within its territorial boundaries, but not beyond.

It follows that to the extent to which the use of the police power for the achieving of any particular purpose is effective the population to which it is applied becomes a selected group. Opponents and misdemeanants are eliminated, or forced into conformity. It is therefore theoretically possible for idea-forces, including religious faiths and moral creeds, still to create community, as well as sectarian, groupings. How far it is practically possible is perhaps well enough illustrated by prohibition legislation in its various forms.

If now we wish to judge what use is likely thus to be made of the police power in culture conflict, we must call to mind the character of the chief groups of conflicting ideas at present arrayed against each other, and, so far as can be foreseen, likely to maintain their antagonism into an indefinitely distant future.

The chief culture conflict today is obviously the world-wide struggle between scientific secularism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the various cults of supernaturalism, obscurantism, and dogmatism. On the side of the cults are the forces of sentiment and inertia. On the side of scientific secularism are arrayed the forces of practical interest. Science makes its way with the multitude, not because the multitude is capable of understanding it, or even of greatly caring about it, but chiefly because the multitude sees that science does things. It safeguards the crops. It prevents or controls epidemics. It cuts down freight rates, and it transmits thought through pathless wastes of firmament and sea.

Now it is a peculiarity of scientific secularism—or profane practicality, if we prefer so to describe it—that, with all its power and prestige, it has not been disposed thus far to employ the police power in furtherance of propagandism or any sort of social group making. It has used it only for general utilitarian ends, as, for example, to enforce sanitation, or to prevent destructive forms of exploitation, like child labor. It has been distinctly opposed to any use of the police power to compel assent to a

belief, to enforce a creed, or to establish any code of purely personal morals.

On the other hand, dogmatic supernaturalism has never cared greatly about utilitarian interests, since these are of the earth, and materialistic. But since the dawn of history dogmatic supernaturalism has unhesitatingly made use of the police power, whenever it has been in a position to do so, to compel assent to articles of faith, to enforce rules of purely personal conduct, and to establish ceremonial forms.

Therefore it is probable that to the extent that scientific secularism commands the situation, cultural association will be free. To the extent that dogmatic supernaturalism, obscurantism, mysticism, are in any region dominant, we may expect them to use the police power to create group solidarity.

Much will depend, accordingly, upon the mental composition of the various regional populations. By this I mean that much will depend upon the predominance, in any given region, of one or another mental type. The inductive, critical, intellectual mind, intuitive of objective relations, turns naturally to scientific secularism. The mystical, emotional, subjectively intuitive, instinctive mind as naturally, indeed inevitably, embraces some highly respectable dogmatism with an impressive pedigree, or rushes upon some new-fangled miracle-ism like Christian Science.

It is to be regretted that we seem to have no quite appropriate descriptive name for these two types of mind. In the writings of European sociologists they are commonly designated as masculine and feminine, and the social dominance of one type or the other is called masculinism or feminism. This usage is sometimes carried to the point of labeling entire nations by sex-connoting terms. Germany, for example, was by Bismarck called a masculine nation, and Russia a feminine nation.

If the analysis of the two mental camps, radical and conservative, which I have presented in the foregoing pages, is substantially accurate, these sex-connecting tags are somewhat inappropriate and misleading. If we adopted them for scientific purposes, we should be compelled to say that the prophet, whether man or woman, is mentally masculine, and that the priest, whether

woman or man, is mentally feminine. This might not mystify because, as a mere satirical conceit, the discrimination has long been familiar. But what would be said if we should apply this nomenclature to the business population of the United States? We should then be compelled to class as masculine the business minds of an engineering type—minds that weigh, measure, calculate, and plan, and to class as feminine all business minds that are incapable of grasping the conception of impersonal causation. This would be to say that American business men in general are woman-like, since they have been unable as yet to find any better explanation of the recent commercial crisis than the truly feminine hypothesis that President Roosevelt did it.

But while we cannot describe intellectualism as masculine, or instinctive dogmatism as merely feminine, we cannot, I think, afford to overlook the influence of the so-called woman's movement, when we try to predict which of the conflicting culture forces will probably be ascendant in civilized life in the near future.

As we see it today, the woman's movement is difficult to analyze. Doubtless we may discover in it an effort by intellectual women to awaken large numbers of their sex to the rational life, to wean them from instinct, and to make their outlook increasingly objective. It is obvious that in certain respects the woman's movement is being so conducted as to defeat this commendable end.

When, for instance, women have made up their minds that they want to see things "from the man's point of view," how shall they go about it?

So far as the somewhat skeptical observer, like myself, can judge, they imagine that they are getting the masculine view when they draw men into the circle of their own projects and enterprises, planned, organized, and conducted by themselves. I may be quite wrong in my interpretation of the facts, and I hold my opinion subject to revision, but at present I am sure that by this process of influencing and converting men women get nothing whatever but an intensification of feminism. They get "the point of view" not of masculine men, but of two somewhat

nondescript varieties, namely, first, those gentlemen who in their schoolboy days preferred daisies and buttercups to snowballs and "double rippers," and second, those authoritative persons who are but too glad to seize upon the opportunity thus afforded them to become the confessors and demigods of a worshipful sex. Such always are the men who lend themselves to those moral crusades which proceed on the assumption that there is only a quantitative difference between virtue of private vintage and the virtue that is squeezed and barreled at the public winepress.

To this particular skeptic now speaking, it appears that the person who at the present moment is commonly styled "the new woman" is of all women in civilized lands the most thoroughly primitive. So far from seeing life from the man's point of view, she has taken herself back to that most ancient camp of her sex from whose sacred ground all strictly non-feminine men were looked upon as scandalous and taboo.

On the other hand, it does not seem to this skeptic that woman necessarily gets the man's point of view by following "the good old way, the simple plan" of giving herself to him in the holy bonds of matrimony and bearing numerous sons to distribute his property.

In reality, her getting the man's point of view, if that is what she wants and is bound to have, depends altogether upon the kind of men, including father and brothers, husbands, sons, and acquaintances that she happens to consort with. If she is thrown with anabolic gentlemen only, she can never arrive at the masculine outlook. If her associations are with masculine men she will enjoy that outlook, if she is capable of seeing it.

Probably nothing can with so much certainty be counted on to bring women into contact with men of essentially masculine type as an intellectual education and the cultivation of intellectual interests in intellectual association and comradeship with men. But this in my judgment is not to be achieved by the ordinary processes of college training only. Intellectual principles must be applied to life, and women must be associated with men in making the application. Of the many spheres of activity in which this may be done, the economic, the scientific, the literary,

and the artistic are not to be despised. Yet, after all, the great realm in which intellectual principles can be and should be applied to life is the realm of politics, and possibly women in general will never really see life from the katabolic bench until, after much pounding at the door, they are admitted to the great masculine Brotherhood of Machiavelli.

If such, however, is the truth, our argument appears to end in dilemma, as indeed, most arguments on practical questions do. For it is not probable that if women generally were at once to participate in political life, the forces of true radicalism, of scientific secularism, could make headway, or even hold their ground. What then would become "of the man's point of view"? The dogmatic programme of using the police power of legislatures and the courts to compel uniformity of moral profession and pretense would in all likelihood be used to the uttermost. We should have retrogression from free and plastic association toward local or community grouping on grounds—not perhaps of belief, as in bygone days, but at least of "good morals."

Happily, no such calamity need be apprehended. Women in general are still too instinctive and too wedded to tradition to avail themselves at once of political opportunities, if these were freely accorded. Those that enter upon political life will in some measure be transformed and broadened by it before the multitude of their sisters follows their example. Therefore, with some confidence we may still hold to the main conclusion that this survey of forces and tendencies of culture conflict has suggested. Political integration will not cease. Scientific secularism, not only through its appeal to the calm intelligence of modern man, but also through its sheer practical utility, will assuredly hold the ground it has taken and make further gains. Whatever its momentary victories, the old, in the long run, cannot overthrow the new, because its own inertia incapacitates it for continuous aggressive action. Therefore we may reasonably expect that the world of social relations will continue from this time on to become less and less a congeries of static, solidaristic groups, more and more a bewildering complex of free associations,

through which the energies of mankind, economized to the uttermost, will freely create the uttermost things of human good.

DISCUSSION

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Leaving theories, classifications, and scientific terminologies to the experts in this presence, it is manifest to the layman that as a matter of fact a sure and profound coming together is a marked characteristic of our times and the inevitable result of culture. Whether we study the religious, political, racial, or social phases of society, everywhere lines are being obscured, superficial differences are being ignored, as fundamental agreements are being discovered. Some wise man has said that progress in philosophy consists not so much in settling as in giving up questions. Logic and the theologies and philosophies based thereon delight in distinctions, may lead to differentiations, but experience, emotion, and, above all, ethics, delights in synthesis and necessitates harmonies. Hence in proportion as intelligence obtains, the doors of sect and political party, race, creed, and social standing, swing easily both ways. Where there are contradictions in beliefs, or even ideas, there is an agreement of ideals. A common quest swings people of diverse origins and in diverse camps into line. Some kind of a catholicism is coming in religion. The organized world which the statesman sees is based on the fraternal elements that are more and more discoverable among races and creeds.

I will not undertake to follow the essayist in his subtle analysis or to gainsay his logic, but I will venture the opinion that as a matter of fact the exceptions to his generalizations are so numerous that they seem to render the rule of little value. There is so much orientalism creeping into the West and occidentalism is so much in demand in the East that any attempt to found a classification on these terms is dangerous. Still more dangerous is it to build up a system of classification, a psychological scheme on the difference between men and women, for the new man is quite as elusive and difficult to label as the new woman. And that third something, the priestly personality, is less and less in evidence in this western world outside of college circles. The gown is more or less discarded by the so-called clergy, and if it remains at all it will be preserved as reminiscence of the ancient régime on the campus and there it will be manifest only on state occasions.

The essayist's definition of religion as "the sentimental worship of dead ideas, a thing of gentle memories and regrets," set over against this something spoken of as "faith," is, to say the least, startling in its freshness, and a still more characteristic evidence of uniqueness in the fact that I suspect it is a definition that few students of religion, friendly or otherwise, can

accept. I certainly do not like that kind of thing any better than the essayist does. I confess my further inability to discover the pertinency, the practical value, or the philosophical justification of a forced antithesis between what he calls "scientific secularism" or "profane practicality" and the "supernaturalism, obscurantism, dogmatism" and, as if there was a deficiency of bad words, our essayist adds another—"miracle-ism." Surely the ideals, the emotions, the passions, the sense of awe, and the "I ought" as well as the "starry heavens above" are objects of scientific study, and such study does yield satisfying results, while, on the other hand, the terms "secularism," "materialism," and the so-called "practicalities," to say the least, furnish their full quota of dogmas and nourish the dogmatic spirit abundantly in these days.

I do not understand that the utilitarian interests are necessarily of the earth or materialistic.

So call not waste that barren cone
Above the floral zone,
Where forests starve:
It is pure use;—
What sheaves like those which here we glean and bind
Of a celestial Ceres and the Muse?

"Naturalism" and "supernaturalism" are dangerous words to play with, but certainly strong wills and stalwart consciences, brave thinkers and noble helpers, find a faith and a religion that is not antagonistic to science and not chained to matter.

As to the woman question here involved, again let me confess that the reasonings of the essayist may be too deep for me, but I believe that any attempt to establish a practical separation in church, in school, in business, or in society on sex lines is as impossible as it is vicious. The most menacing division of today is that which separates the social and intellectual life of the post-academic age into sex groups. The woman- and man-club habit harks back to outgrown monasticism, to mediaeval inefficiency. The demand of science as well as the trend of culture and the inspiration of ethics is toward a larger union, the ultimate synthesis of men and women in the higher life of the state, the advanced interests of culture, morals, and religion, in which I believe and of which I have great hopes.

PROFESSOR GEORGE A. COE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

The paper of Professor Giddings has opened a wide and enticing vista. If it were possible for me to follow him down it step by step I should be able and glad to add illustrations and confirmations of many of the points that he has made. It does not seem to me possible, however, in the available time, to traverse so broad a topic. Indeed, if I were to suggest a general difficulty with the paper it would be that within the limit of a half-hour the writer

could hardly cover so much territory and yet adequately define all the terms that he was using. With the last speaker I find myself somewhat at sea because I do not know exactly what Mr. Giddings meant by various expressions that he employed. Yet I suppose that we hardly ought to expect the masculine process of katabolism to be completed upon so important and extensive material within half an hour. I should like to know, nevertheless, what was in his mind with regard to "impersonal causation." I wish I knew what he meant by "scientific secularism." I wish I knew whether the propositions that he made with regard to religious organizations cover all of them and all the dominant tendencies in religious organizations with which he is familiar.

In the time that I have at my disposal it will be impossible for me to touch upon more than one point in any detail, and this, too, is a point at which further definition is needed. I agree with the speaker that we have to do here with extra-logical contradictions of ideas, but what is the nature of these extra-logical conflicts? A full answer to this question would require a psychology of belief which cannot be given here. I can, however, I think, confidently lay down one or two propositions in the form of conclusions on this topic.

An idea always has some reference to active processes in which it arises and to active processes in which it issues. An actual idea must have meaning, and the meaning of any idea has reference to some kind of practical attitude that the thinker has assumed or is likely to assume. We cannot separate living ideas from the vital processes in which we are taking part. A belief, accordingly, in one aspect of it, is the intellectual side of a programme of action. Take a belief apart from some act that it contemplates, and you have no longer a belief.

Functionally considered, then, an idea or a belief is a tendency to action—or let us say a purpose—that has come, or is coming, to conscious formulation. Nothing short of this is an actual or living idea. After a purpose has evaporated the verbal symbol of it may remain, but the symbol of a dead purpose is no longer an idea. There is as great a difference between such a symbol and an idea as there is between a fossil fish and a fish. This distinction is an important one, for living ideas and fossil ideas are mixed together in the whole of society. We find it so in the state; we find it in political parties; we find it in the universities, just as we find it in religion.

The problem of the group-making influence of contradictions of ideas and beliefs depends for its solution upon this question: What social effect tends to follow the process of making our purposes fully conscious to ourselves? In other words, when the instinctive and habitual and imitative modes of activity are transformed into the conscious and intentional forms of activity, when the things which are going on express themselves in intellectual formulation, what is the effect?

I think we can make a very simple answer to this question, and the answer will indicate where I am inclined to vary from some of the conclusions of the speaker. The general proposition is, first, that the initial effect of thinking our purposes is to focalize them and so intensify the social oppositions based upon them. But, second, as we continue to analyze these purposes we broaden our horizon, and thus we develop new sympathies, understand the opposing point of view, find that thinking tends to remove the very antagonisms that it has helped to create. This seems to be parallel with the logical process. We know that any idea tends to subsume itself under a more general idea; just so a purpose when it becomes conscious of itself tends to seek a higher point of view wherein the two opposing purposes can be united. When competition stops to think, it gives rise to combination. When we quiet the war-cries of our political parties, especially when we get beyond our catchwords and ask what is the real principle underlying our political conflicts, we find that political bitterness can no longer exist. When two political parties define their purposes to themselves, each finds the relative validity of the purposes of the other group. This seems to be a general law. Let me state it again: The initial effect of thinking our social purposes is to intensify our social oppositions, but the ultimate effect of the broader and deeper thinking is to remove these very oppositions.

This is true of religious organizations as well as of political and other organizations—and let me say right here that, as far as I can see, the speaker's apparent removal of political organizations from the sphere of idea and belief conflicts is entirely artificial. Just as far as, in forming a state or modifying a constitution, we employ thought processes, we form political creeds. We have our political creeds as well as our religious creeds, and political conflicts are in part conflicts of political creeds. It seems to me that we have the essential problem of oppositions of ideas in all social groups that have begun to analyze their own purposes.

This is the clue to religious conflicts. I shall speak first of the matter that concerns us most, the faith that we are in contact with, the Christian religion. At the outset the Christian idea was practically identical with the Christian purpose, and that purpose was profoundly social. But contact with Greek philosophy and Roman law led to efforts to define the Christian idea abstractly and statically. At best such definitions could express only one side of the Christian idea. For an idea, as we have seen, has two sides, a mental image, or symbol, and a meaning, the latter of which involves an active attitude or purpose. Official Christianity turned its attention to the image-side of Christian ideas. Mental images were collected, systematized, insisted upon, handed down from generation to generation.

These symbols, largely fossil ideas, are the main ground of the mutual oppositions of the Christian sects. It could easily be proved from recent events that what delays the union of the Protestant sects, at least, is not the

present purposes of any of them, but a certain clinging to the symbols of old thought processes. As fast as these sects gain a clear consciousness of their own living ideas, that is, the actual purposes of the life that they are now living, opposition to one another will fade away, and they will find themselves irresistibly drawn together. It is not extravagant to foresee the ultimate union, first, of the Protestant sects, and then—well, I do not believe that it involves any insane delusion to suppose that even the opposition between Protestants and Catholics will some day disappear through the discovery that both purpose the same thing for the world. I can hardly guess how pope or council will state this purpose; I do not even know how the Protestants will state it; but the event seems to me as certain as the development of self-consciousness concerning our real purposes.

Now I want to say a word about radicalism and conservatism as applied to religion. The most radical idea that ever entered the heart of man is the thoroughgoing critique of human purposes that expresses itself in religion. Religion is radical because it preaches most general and profound discontent with things as they are. Pessimism is not as radical as religion; for, though pessimism finds no end of fault, it has not the grit to go to work to reconstruct life. But religion undertakes to transform our life and even our nature itself! There is radicalism for you! It is the greatest radicalism in all history. It is the most enterprising thing in all history. It may be a fatuous enterprise, but it is an enterprise—the enterprise of the explorer, of the pioneer, of the masculine element of society—if that is the enterprising element. Now it is only an incident in the history of Christianity that makes it appear so difficult for religion to employ the scientific method for determining the means of attaining its ends. The essential radicalism of the enterprise will yet demand the rigor of that method, and we shall see religion becoming more and more an application of scientific sociology to the world's deepest needs.

What is "scientific secularism"? Science has only one purpose, and that is to know. I do not see that this is particularly secular. Science does not prescribe to the secularist his secular purposes. He is not a secularist because he is scientific, but because he has espoused some ambition different from the religious ambition. There is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent both the secularist and the religionist from being scientific. Science in its relation to civilization plays the part of an instrument. It does not play the part of master. It does not determine what we shall choose as the good in life, but the real character of religion and of secularism is expressed in what each chooses as its good.

When idea-formation advances far enough to generalize human purposes merely as human, then we behold the full social significance of the whole process. The idea of human purposes as merely, broadly human underlies the movement for world peace. This movement has its greatest strength in

religious faith, and specifically the Christian faith in the possibilities of human nature. I do not believe that we can get world-peace by anything short of this broad way of thinking of ourselves. A stable world-society is not possible through any balancing of national interests that continue to think themselves merely as national. The nations must first think their purposes in a more completely human way. The half-idea makes for division; the whole idea for peace. Who knows, then, but that in the end we shall find that the greatest solvent of social conflicts is religion?

MRS. C. P. GILMAN, NEW YORK CITY

Holding that conflicts of ideas and beliefs are likely to play an important part in the group-making of the future, and accepting Professor Giddings' inclusion of the mental attitude of the holder as an essential factor in the ideas and beliefs, I wish to make a few suggestions as to the classification of mental attitudes on which he lays so much stress.

This conservatism of women, on which he so strenuously insists, is perhaps best shown to us all in their slavish adherence from year to year and from season to season to one unvarying fashion in matters of dress. (*Laughter.*)

It is shown again in their well-known quickness of adaptation—and now I am speaking seriously—to new conditions of life and environment; in their alleged exceeding men in criminality whenever they become criminals; in their pushing forward in rapidly increasing numbers to fill every industrial opportunity as fast as they can win it against the conservatism of men; in the fact that in the early history of industry they invented and developed many arts and crafts while man was still but a hunter and a fighter.

The conservatism of women is in exact proportion to their ignorance and restriction; and singularly enough, the progressiveness of men is in inverse proportion to that state. It may be suggested therefore that the distinction is merely one of status; and that the remarkable permanence, in a progressive age, of the patriarchal restriction of women, is due to a peculiar conservatism in men; further, that most of our hindering conservatism of all sorts springs from the injurious persistence of that primitive androcentric institution, the family with the male head.

As against the alleged conservatism of women, do we not see in the "masculine camp" a most conspicuous instance of immovable tradition in the continued deification of the most primitive masculine traits—those of aggressive and combative activities, still practiced even when universally harmful, and still justified and admired in the face of all the accumulated facts of an industrially productive age?

It may be held from one view-point that the world's best progress has come from the productive industries essentially feminine in origin; and that

this progress has been continually injured and retarded by the persistent survival of the early masculine traditions of aggression and destruction.

It may be further suggested that the really essential ideas and beliefs of woman (or her mental attitude), as distinguished from those of the man, are most vitally important in the group-making of the future, in that, from the mother-instinct, women tend to form beneficent groups for the better rearing of the young. (Consider for instance the bees and the ants.) Such groups are one of our most imperative and instant needs today, and they are retarded not by the conservatism of women, but by the economically mandatory ideas and beliefs of men.

HON. C. P. CARY, WISCONSIN, STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

I don't wish to discuss this question even five minutes, but just one minute. I want to call attention to one point in which it seems to me I could not wholly follow the splendid address by Professor Coe, and that is in his apparently entire reliance upon the reasonableness of men when they come to see that they are after the same thing. These matters are not altogether intellectual. Intellectual agreement among men will not solve the whole problem of class conflict by any means. I think the clashes are not so much intellectual clashes in the world at large; they are mainly clashes of interests of various sorts.

REV. F. A. GILMORE, MADISON, WIS.

The part that the conservative forces have played, especially the religious forces, in early and primitive society, has not been fairly stated by Professor Giddings. It is true that a man may go back to a supposed primitive state of society, and in his utter ignorance of what primitive society actually was, he may picture things, he may group things, as he pleases. I assume that nobody knows nor ever can know all the elements in the primordial social group, any more than the psychologist can know the mental contents of the infant's mind.

Professor Giddings has grouped conveniently the primitive social order into these two classes. I will accept it. But what was the function of the conservative and the religious instincts? Was there any useful purpose played by it? Well, he might turn to his friend, Lester F. Ward, and show that it was the function of religion, of conservatism, to hold the group together, and prevent the so-called masculine, rationalistic minds from disappearing from the group and destroying it. It was religion that preserved society in its inception. And then Professor Ward turns around and, acknowledging that it was religion that preserved early man, preserved the social group until it could become solidified, he says, nevertheless, it was all a huge error. It was a great error. Now, I want to say that that is unscientific, because this idea of causation must embrace all of its effects, and one of

its effects was the preservation of the primitive social group, and the means thereto was religion, and because primitive man believed in gods and in his deified ancestors, I claim it is utterly illogical for a man to argue thus that religion corresponds to no abiding reality.

Let me define religion from the point of view of this philosophic test. It is the conscious and the voluntary commerce of the human spirit with that ideal Source whence it has sprung. The conception of God is the conception of the highest good, of the perfect and complete social order, of the entire cosmic process, as it has been up to now and is going to be; therefore I claim it is the most penetrating idea that has ever dawned upon the human intellect.

Impersonal causation: it is like Schopenhauer's will. He takes the human will and whittles it down to the edge of zero, and plants it out in the cosmos, and says, "This is what has done it." Professor Ward's books appear to be the modern expression of the ancient materialism and determinism, the old struggle between the physical and spiritual order of the world. There is no place in it for God, for spirituality. The ultimate cause of things, he tells us, is collision. Collision is not a cause; it is an effect. And he proposes to show that consciousness, like weight or like color, is a property of matter. Gentlemen, if you propose to lead humanity on and up by a merely mechanical process you are kicking against the pricks. It can't be done.

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

I shall make no reply to the gentleman's remarks. I am satisfied that half an hour's conversation would show that he and I are in perfect agreement on these matters.

I did say somewhere that we had better get rid of the old dogma that error is necessarily bad. The primitive error of mankind was absolutely necessary. The conditions under which intelligence has always dawned were such as to lead to a vast mass of error which we call magic and superstition. Now that mass of error was in its time highly useful.

The only thing I had thought of saying on the question under discussion this morning was relative to the phrase "group-making rôle," and I think my interpretation of that phrase would be quite different from that of those who framed the title of this paper. That there is an immense group-making value in conflict I have no doubt; but the kind of groups that it makes are not differentiated groups but integrated groups. The point has been touched upon by at least two of the speakers. We must come to recognize that the only constructive force in the world, the one that everything that exists has been the product of, is the interaction, the antithetical antagonism of diverse and, when it comes to the social plane, hostile forces. But it is only in our great social problems that we find it so plainly marked. We have to do with the application of an absolutely cosmical principle, which begins with the formation of worlds, which is seen in the formation of all the

substances of nature, and which we find working in the same manner throughout society. I have called it by various names; in society it may perhaps best be called social integration. But it never occurs until after the long process of division by which differences are produced before the contact or the conflict begins. The effect of these hostile forces, popularly supposed to be destructive, is eminently and universally constructive.

MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, NEW YORK CITY

I think that one of the implications of Professor Giddings' paper has not been specifically touched upon: the implication that group-making is not only past in our sociological progress in its earlier phases, but that group-making is no longer essential in the development of the individual and of society. If I am not correct in that implication, Professor Giddings will mention it.

I should like to bring the discussion for a moment to a very practical point of our present-day life. I am acquainted with a district in New York City in which there is a school where thirty-five hundred children are educated, of these children 98 per cent. have parents who do not speak the English language, have no traditions that introduce them easily into our American life. And of those children, as reported recently, 95 per cent. were born across the water. They are being introduced into a new condition of life in rapid and violent manner; one in which the attachment of the individual to the state and to general society is at work in a way practically incomprehensible to the parents of those children. Now in this process one may see the disintegration of personality, or the failure to integrate personality by reason of removing violently and rapidly all the group-making supports, all the traditional coverings, all the protection by which the undeveloped individual reaches the power to make direct attachment to the state at large. It strikes me that as long as our present way of carrying on the race continues—in this presence we do not prognosticate what may be—but as long as we have children born to be inducted into a complicated social relationship, we shall need some group protection, some covering and surroundings of the little atom of life. We get them through the family, we get them through the school, but more and more the single individual is attached directly to society at large and in a period of youth and incompetency.

If I should take you from this presence into another place where I go, I could show you line upon line of little cots containing foundling children. Each child there has a direct relationship to the state, because the state will not permit that child to be wholly abandoned; it takes it in charge; it gives it at least a number, a bed, and a chance at life. But when we consider that every one of those foundling children represents a violent **detachment** from that which all the experience of the past has found necessary to give the child a little protection from those forces that sweep through our social

life, we see that we are in a difficulty about those children; so philanthropy says the best we can do is to give them a foster home. And that is what we are trying to do for them.

My point is this: there never was a time in the history of civilization when the social organization was so directly concerned with every individual human being, even before he understands at all what is being done to him; and in the little child down on the lower east side of New York who comes into an environment so utterly different from that of which he has had knowledge, that his own parents cannot follow him into that environment, but remain behind, we have there a detached human being without any sort of group protection: and that is why, for the first time in the history of America, we are having a Jewish criminal problem. It is because of the detachment of the undeveloped individual from his natural group protection and guidance.

My further point is this: I cannot see any prospect of our peopling the world with new generations unless we begin with little children. I do not see any time coming when childhood and adolescence, with all their dangers, will not still require these protecting group formations. The group-making instinct therefore, I believe, is a persistent one; only we are now coming to the time when we can choose more than ever before our groups for ourselves.

CONCLUDING REMARKS OF PROFESSOR F. H. GIDDINGS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

If one way to indorse what a speaker has said is to demonstrate point by point that the things that he did not say are not so, I am highly complimented.

To touch, for example, on the last point that was made by Mrs. Spencer: the main thesis of my paper was that the group-making rôle of the conflict of ideas continues, but that it is resulting in enabling us more and more to choose our groups for ourselves. That is really the only thing that I was trying to say in my paper.

On one question I should be more sorry to be misquoted than on any other. The first speaker intimated that I had set religion over against scientific secularism. I beg to dissent. I carefully indicated that I set something which I called "faith" over against "reminiscent" or "backward-looking" religion. I believe that I said nothing whatever in the paper about religion in general. I have no recollection of any such passage. I did talk about "backward-looking religion," or "reminiscent religion," as over against "faith," and faith may be religious or it may be a scientific secularism. I did not enter into the question which it is. Speaking merely for myself, I should take the stand of scientific secularism.

This distinction between two different kinds of "sacred things," one of which we may call "faith" and one of which we may call "religion," I did not invent. I have often wondered how many persons who use the word "religion" are aware of the fact that once upon a time religion was defined,

by persons who were exact in their uses of words, for an exact purpose; namely, for the legal purpose of settling disputes. I believe that the oldest definition of the word "religion" that we have is in the writings of Gaius. Gaius tells us that there are two kinds of "things subject to divine dominion," namely, "sacred things and things religious." "Sacred things are those consecrated to the gods above, religious, those devoted to the gods below." Any man could make a religious thing by simply burying a dead body in the earth, but a thing could be made sacred only by the Roman people and the senate.

The distinction was significant: the people who never could look ahead were the religious people; the people who looked ahead, who were willing to get away from a narrow and backward view of things, the people who had "sacred" things were those that were capable of the conception of a great state. They had gods above; the others had gods below. There is more in this than a matter of definition. It brings us to the contrast that Professor Coe spoke of, and which is the essence of the whole matter. Some ideas are, as he says, the symbols of evaporated purpose—a good phrase—and some ideas are living; they express present purpose. And so there are two kinds of people in the world, those whose ideals are chiefly the symbols of evaporated purpose, and those whose ideals express a living and front-facing purpose.

It makes little difference what set of definitions of terms we use, if we fix our minds upon this important distinction. I have spoken of it as the distinction between instinct and reason, a familiar psychological distinction. I have spoken of it as the difference between the conservative and the radical. That is the popular distinction. Professor Coe states it in yet another way, but it is after all the same distinction. And when he says that what keeps the Protestant sects apart is their habit of clinging to symbols of old purposes, I thoroughly agree with him. When a purpose can be made clear to consciousness, when instead of merely following instinct, or habit or tradition, or dogma, we stop and visualize our purpose and think about it and, above all, connect it with all sorts of things, so that we correlate or organize our whole scheme of thought, we are beginning to do the thing which ultimately will ameliorate conflict, because it will enable people not only to think that they agree, but to know that they agree, which is a different thing. It is only when we have "thought the thing through" in that way, and rationally know that we agree, that we have an enduring basis of peace.

Mr. Coe said that religion might employ science quite as much as secularism may employ it. I see no reason to object. I wish that it would.

There is one thing that I want to say by way of comment upon Mrs. Gilman's remarks, which in the main I agree with. Mrs. Gilman is fond of her illustration of the bees. I wish that she wouldn't use it, because Mrs. Gilman stands for the kind of thing that I was talking about when I said

that there are some women who get the rational view of things and who really know what the amelioration of the intellectual condition of women ought to be. So I am always pained when she uses this illustration of the bees, because a colony of bees is a colony of degenerate creatures in which just one individual is fully developed; the others are what they are, and do the things that they do, because they haven't had enough to eat. We don't want a society of bees. We want a society of fully fed men and women, who will have energy enough to live not only a full physical and a full emotional, but also a full intellectual life.